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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a model of an agent’s behavior that
takes into account emotions and moral values. In our pro-
posal, when the description of the current situation reveals
that a moral value is ‘at stake’, the moral goal of re-establishing
the threatened value is included among the active goals.
The compliance with values generates positive emotions like
pride and admiration, while the opposite brings to shame
and self-reproach.
During the deliberation phase, the agent appraises her
plans in terms of the emotional reward they are expected
to yield, given the trade off between moral and individ-
ual goals. In this phase, the emotional reward affects the
agent’s choices about her behavior. After the execution
phase, one’s and others’ actions are appraised again in terms
of the agent’s values, giving rise to moral emotions.
The paper shows how emotional appraisal can be coupled
with the choice among possible lines of action, presenting
a mapping between plans and emotions that integrates and
extends preceding proposals.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.m [ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE]: Miscellaneous;
I.2.1 [ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE]: Knowledge Rep-
resentation Formalisms and Methods
General Terms
Languages, Theory
Keywords
emotions, moral values, empathic agents
1. INTRODUCTION
Notwithstanding the efforts put by scholars in trying to
understand the complex mechanisms underlying moral rea-
soning, in fields that range from agent theories [14, 9] and
cognitive science [11] to deontic logics [21], most approaches
fall short of explaining the complex interplay of moral be-
havior and emotions. This interplay becomes very relevant
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when it comes to designing virtual agents who must dis-
play a believable emotional behavior. Although an artificial
agent may be programmed to always choose the action that
achieves the right goal in a moral sense, the capability of
reasoning on moral values is important for designing virtual
agents who act as companions, counsellors, and so on. More
importantly, for such agents, it is important that they also
have the capability of understanding the emotions that ac-
company moral choices, since they need to show empathy
with their human partners. According to Susan Stark, in
fact, “it has been argued that emotions play a crucial role
in moral epistemology and that agents simply cannot have
complete and accurate moral perception and cannot make
reliable moral judgment absent emotional engagement with
moral situations.” [31] (p. 355).
The relevance of a moral dimension in the implementation
of autonomous agents was highlighted in [1]. In that paper,
it was also pointed out that it is important to have ‘explicit’
models of ethical behavior, where the behavior of the agent is
driven by a declarative representation of moral values. The
alternative is the use of implicit models where the moral
behavior is hard-wired in the implementation. The advan-
tage of an explicit model is that the agent can reason about
its values and choose the best line of behavior in a flexible
and context-dependent way. The claim of this paper is that
moral principles affect the choice of actions in a way that
respects the general organization of an autonomous agent.
There is a complex interplay between the agent’s individ-
ual goals and her moral values, which mainly derive from
the group or society she belongs to. In this perspective, a
paradigmatic situation is given by moral dilemmas, which
are a particular case of the issue of choosing the best action
in an environment where the agent can have multiple, in-
compatible goals [2].
Another reason for adopting an explicit model of ethical
behavior is that it enables us to model the relationship be-
tween ethically-driven actions and emotions. According to
[12], the desire to attain positive emotions constitutes one
of the strongest forces that produce behavior. In case of
decisional oppositions, an agent’s tendency to preserve her
moral well-being (often perceived as a value per-se in ev-
eryday life) can help her to choose a line of behavior, es-
pecially when the opposition concerns individual goals and
moral concerns. Consider, for example, two agents, Max and
Mary: Max wants to have a chocolate candy, but the only
way to satisfy this desire is to steal Mary’s candy. If honesty,
for Max, is more important than his hunger for chocolate,
he will drop the goal; otherwise, he will steal the chocolate
candy. But, if his desire is very strong, Max may eventually
steal the chocolate candy despite his strong sense of honesty,
(mis)lead by the anticipation of the pleasure he would feel
by tasting the delicious taste of the chocolate.
In this paper, we pursue the following research goals:
• Integrating the notion of moral values in agent delib-
eration, in a way that be compatible with practical ar-
chitectures; as shown by the example above, the goal of
this model is not to build an idealised model of moral
deliberation, but to provide a way to simulate practical
reasoning about values.
• Acknowledging the role of emotions during and after
the process of value-sensitive deliberation; the model
grasps the role of emotions in the choice among com-
peting (and incompatible) moral alternatives, allowing
an agent to “feel”and express the emotional range that
accompanies moral deliberation.
The paper is structured in the following way: after sur-
veying the related work, in Section 3, we illustrate the back-
ground assumptions and motivations for our model, described
in Section 4. In Section 5, we propose an agent architecture
based on this model. Discussion and conclusions end the
paper.
2. RELATEDWORK
Regarding the field of computational model of emotions,
many works tried to integrate an emotional component in
a cognitive architecture for intelligent agents [29, 16, 24].
Although different theories of emotions have been proposed
(including physiological and dimensional models), most com-
putational models are based on appraisal theories, in which
cognitive processes are involved in the generation of emo-
tions [26, 23, 30]. According to appraisal theories, cognitive
processes have the function of building a mental represen-
tation of the situation in which a person is involved (fol-
lowing [25] we call this representation “person-environment
relation”). Emotions arise from appraisal of the person-
environment relation according to appraisal dimensions that
are defined in the theory (i.e. desirability of an event, likeli-
hood of an event, causal attribution for the agent, etc.). Dif-
ferent computational models refer to different appraisal the-
ories. For example, many computational models [16, 29, 15,
17] are inspired by the OCC (Ortony Clore Collins) model
[26], while Lazarus’s [23] and Scherer’s theory [30] are im-
plemented respectively by [18] and [3]. In the following, for
the sake of brevity, we compare computational models of
emotions chiefly on the basis of which appraisal derivation
and affect derivation model are used.
The appraisal derivation model specifies how the appraisal
variables are derived from the representation of the person-
enviroment relation [25]. Then, the appraisal variables are
used by the affect derivation model to generate the emo-
tional response for the agents. Most computational mod-
els use domain-independent rules to construe the emotional
response in affect-derivation model [18, 3, 29, 15, 17] but
few computational models are based on an independent ap-
proach to derive the appraisal variables in the appraisal
derivation model, the major are: EM (Emotion Model) [29],
FLAME (Fuzzy Logic Adaptive Model of Emotions) [15] and
EMA (EMotion and Adaptation) [18].
EM [29] employs the goal processing to assess appraisal
variables in an independent way to evaluate outcomes of
events (i.e. the goal failure and success determine the eval-
uation of an event as desiderable or undesiderable). But,
regarding the evaluation of actions, the appraisal derivation
model is not domain-independent and it is limited to as-
sign credit or blame to the success or failure of goals. As
noted by the authors in [29], this is not feasible in order
to model all possible evaluations of actions with respect to
moral values (standards). Besides, goals must be decoupled
from the evaluation of actions, in order to make possible
the generation of emotions regarding only the evaluation
of actions (i.e. Pride, Shame, Admiration and Reproach).
In FLAME [15] appraisal and affect derivation model are
based on domain-independent fuzzy rules, but, FLAME uses
an heuristic approach based on user feedback to model the
evaluation of actions. The user can perform in the system
action as “bad agent” or “good agent” so the agent can as-
sociate a value “v” to actions that represent the goodness
level of the action. Moral values are not modeled in an es-
plicit and, although FLAME uses an independent approach
in the appraisal derivation, the agent is not endowed with a
inner model that she can adopt to evaluate the moral conse-
quences of her actions. In EMA [18], inspired by Lazarus’s
appraisal theory [23], appraisal is formed by a set of indepen-
dent processes that operate on a plan-based representation
of person-enviroment relation, named causal interpretation.
With respect to moral emotions, EMA models only Anger
and Guilt [20] and doesn’t encompass other moral emotions.
The authors argue that modeling moral values, as in the
OCC model, is an approach too constrained and only credit
or blame are assigned to actions as positive and negative
utility over states. But, as authors noted in [18] an explicit
representation of moral values is a requirement to make dis-
tinctions between certain emotional states (e.g. guilt from
shame) and to inform dialogue or coping strategies.
Being posited at the junction of values and emotions, moral
emotions have received less attention than goal–related ones.
We believe that the notion of value can be an effective tool
to model emotions characterized by a prominently moral
nature. The design of an agent who reacts to moral val-
ues requires the interaction of a rational and an emotional
component. Both components should embed some notion of
moral value, to let the agent reason about the compliance
with values at the behavioral level, and feel moral emotions
[20] when her values are put at stake or re-established.
We avail ourselves of the OCC model (as EM [29] and FLAME
[15] did) and, inspired by EMA [18], our model take into
account syntactic information of the plan-based representa-
tion. Also, we adopt the goal processing approach of EM
[29] to assess some appraisal variables as “desirability”.
With respect to other computational models, we model moral
values in an explicit way and provide domain independent
rules to encompass the appraisal derivation of actions with
respect to moral values. We rely on our previous work [10] to
establish an explicit link between moral values, moral emo-
tions and the appraisal of action with domain independent
rules based on moral values. Further, we use emotions in
the deliberation phase of the agent.
3. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATIONS
In the OCC theory [26], the person-environment relation
is represented by goals, standards and attitudes; appraisal
dimensions are represented by desirability (or undesirability)
of an event, praiseworthiness (or blameworthiness) of an ac-
tion, liking (or disliking) of an object. In OCC, emotions
are divided in four basic classes:
• Event-based emotions, that arise from reactions to events
(i.e. being pleased (or displeased) about the event with
respect to goals).
• Attribution emotions, that arise from reactions to agents
(i.e. approval (or disapproval) of an action performed
by an agent with respect to standards).
• Attraction emotions, that arise from reactions to ob-
jects (i.e. liking (or disliking) of an object with respect
to attitudes).
• Compound emotions, that arise emotions that arise
when the same situation is appraised at the same time
as an action and an event
According to this model, the agent’s “standards” (i.e. the
agent’s “beliefs in term of which moral and other kinds of
judgmental evaluations are made”) affect the evaluation of
self and others’ actions. While in the OCC model goals are
conceived as states of affairs that one wants to obtain, stan-
dards concern the state of affairs that one believes she ought
to obtain. Standards represent the beliefs in terms of which
moral and other kinds of judgmental evaluations are made,
such as you ought to have tried harder or you ought not
to do things that upset other people citeOrtony88. Actions
that meet the agent’s standards are deemed praiseworthy,
and their execution triggers emotions like pride and admira-
tion. Conversely, blameworthy actions trigger emotions like
shame and reproach.
Following [10], we define the praiseworthiness of an ac-
tion on the basis of the goal that motivates the action it-
self: an action is praiseworthy if it is motivated by a value–
dependent goal, and the value the goal depends on is ac-
knowledged as such by the appraising agent. In other words,
the praiseworthiness is not an intrinsic property of the ac-
tion, but resides in the motivations that determine the agent’s
intention to execute it, i.e., the commitment to a goal. The
role of values is relevant not only for the appraisal of an
agent’s own actions, but also for the appraisal of other agents’
behavior. When the appraising agent differs from the agent
of the appraised action, the appraising agent evaluates the
other agent’s actions according to her own values, praising
that action only if she can ascribe to the other agent the
value–dependent goal to re–establish a value at stake (that
she shares with the other agent). Conversely, the blamewor-
thiness of an action is defined on the basis of the effects it
brings about in the state of the world. If an action puts at
stake a value of the appraising agent, it is considered blame-
worthy, independently of the motivation of the action’s agent
to execute it.
We also consider the four compound emotions that are
characterized by the conjunction of Attribution emotions
and Event-based emotions, like Joy and Distress.
Following an established line in emotion modeling [29],
the desirability of an event can be defined with respect to
its consequences for the appraising agent’s goals. If an event
brings about a state of affairs in which a goal of the apprais-
ing agent is satisfied, the event is desirable; the event is
undesirable if its effects are in conflict with the satisfaction
of a goal of appraising agent.
Emotional appraisal plays a twofold role in our agent ar-
chitecture and it is split into two distinct phases: in the
deliberation phase, the agent feels “anticipatory” emotions,
which help her trade off her individual goals with the goals
that she has formed as an effect of her values; after the
execution phase, the agent updates her beliefs and feels a
certain emotion according to the emotional appraisal of the
obtained state of the world.
Similarly to anticipatory reasoning on actions, which allows
agents to envisage the consequences of their possible behav-
iors, anticipatory emotional appraisal allows the agent to
choose a line of behavior in the light of the emotional states
it would determine in the agent (emotional reward). Since
the OCC model acknowledges a distinction between positive
and negative emotional states, the agent will tend to prefer
the lines of behavior that are more likely to make positive
emotional stases arise in her. Attribution emotions work
in favour of the compliance with values; conversely, Well-
being emotions tend to privilege individual goals, but the
two types of emotions, each of which encompasses a positive
and a negative polarity, compensate each other in a way
that depends on the context (subjective values and beliefs,
available plans, etc.).
In particular, moral appraisal requires the agent to ac-
count not only for the intrinsic morality of her goals, but for
the notion of ‘responsibility’ that is related with the side ef-
fects of one’s behavior [7]. Since an agent is held responsible
not only for the intended effects of her actions, but also for
the unwanted effects which negatively affect her goals and
values (including those of the society she is part of), it is
necessary for the agent to assess the compliance with values
not only by examining her own goals, but also by considering
the practical actions she may perform to achieve them. So,
in the model we propose, emotional appraisal is conducted
by expanding the agent’s goals into the plans (to a limited
degree, for cognitive and computational reasons) and by as-
sessing the consequences of these plans on the agent’s goals
and values in order to foresee possible interference. Notice
that this mechanism is necessary to deal with the paradig-
matic case of moral dilemmas, where an agent is faced with
values which, although not ideally in contrast, in the given
context mutually exclude each other since any possible way
to attain one makes impossible the attainment of the other
[2].
Since the model of emotional appraisal we propose relies
on the evaluation of the plans the agent forms to achieve her
goals (both individual and value–based ones), some relevant
qualities of these plans are accounted for, such as the proba-
bility of success, the effort required and their importance for
the achievement of the agent’s goals. We use the syntac-
tic structure of plans to derive the affect intensity model.
For example, the importance of goal is multiplied with the
probability of success to calculate the intensity of goal-based
emotions. The effort (i.e. the cost of the plan) is a measure
that reduces the intensity of goal-based emotions.
Finally, after the execution of actions, the agent moni-
tors the environment and updates her emotional states by
assessing the actual consequences of her own actions, and
the changes that have spontaneously occurred or have been
brought about by other agents. While in anticipatory ap-
praisal only the rules for Well-being emotions and attribu-
tion emotions are applied, in this phase Event–based emo-
tions are also considered.
We claim that, when the agent translates her goals into
practical lines of behavior, the projection of these lines of
behavior must also encompass the evaluation of the agent’s
own emotional states, such as shame or pride, that con-
tribute to orientate the agent’s choice towards value-compliant
courses of actions. The advantage of this integration is that
the agent not only forms her goals based on the compliance
with her values, but moral emotions become relevant when
conflicting goals (and plans) are formed and the compliance
with values (or with one’s own private goals) must be traded
off.
4. VALUE-SENSITIVE AGENT MODEL
In a previous work by [13], a BDI agent is extended with
the notion of values and emotions. In this paper we fur-
ther extend the agent model by defining an agent as a pair
(MS,E) where MS is the agent mental state and E is the
agent emotional state. The mental state of an agent in-
cludes the agent’s Beliefs B, a set of Goals G, a set of Values
V and a set of Values at stake VatStake (Fig. 2).
The beliefs base B is a collection of literals in traditional
logic programming style.
The agent’s values are organized in a scale of values [32].
A value v ∈ V is represented by a tuple v(r,d,Vc): r is a
real number with range [−1, 1] and denotes the importance
of the value, d is a real number with range [−1, 1] and rep-
resents the degree with which the value is shared with the
society [2], Vc is the set of violation conditions. If one or
more conditions vci ∈ Vc hold in the agent’s beliefs the value
is put at stake.
Following the approach described in [33], a goal g is de-
fined by a tuple g(Ac, Sc, Fc, S, Π). Ac is the set of adop-
tion conditions: when one or more conditions aci ∈ Ac hold
in the beliefs base, the goal (which usually is in a sleep-
ing state) is adopted by the agent (i.e. the goal becomes a
desire, following the BDI model). Sc is the set of success
conditions: when one or more conditions sci ∈ Sc hold in
the belief base, the goal is achieved and dropped. Fc is the
set of failure conditions: when one or more conditions fci
∈ Fc hold in the belief base, the goal is unachievable (so it
is dropped). The success and failure conditions are useful
for decoupling goals and plans. A plan can fail, but if the
failure condition is not true in the agent’s beliefs the goal is
not dropped, since the agent can find another plan to reach
the goal. S is the goal state (Fig.1). A goal is in an adopted
state when the agent considers it as an available options.
An adopted goal can be in a suspended state or in an active
state. Being in an active state means that the agent’s focus
is on the active goals1. A dropped goal can be achieved or
1An high-level goal and its subgoals can be active at the
same time. This is not a problem, because in practical ar-
unachieved, while a goal is in a sleeping state when it is not
in the agent’s options. Finally, Π is the set of plans associ-
ated with the goal.
A goal can be an individual or a moral goal. The set of
individual goals is named GI , while the set of moral goals is
named GS . We consider a moral goal as a value-dependent
goal with a general adoption, success and failure conditions
related to the re-establishment of a value (i.e. a moral goal
is in the form re-establish(vx)).
Figure 1: Taxonomy of goals states
The emotional state is represented as the set of current
emotions E that the agent feels(Fig. 2). An emotion is
represented by a tuple e(Type, Int, Obj, Ag): Type is the
emotion category according to OCC model, Int is the inten-
sity of emotion (a real number), Obj is the cause of emotion
(i.e. the goal or value from which emotion rises), Ag iden-
tifies who is the target of the emotion (self or another agent).
Finally, the agent has a means-ends reasoning capability.
A plan is represented by a tuple pi(G, T, u) where G is the
set of goals that the plan may look for, T is the hierarchical
structure decomposition of the plan and u is the emotion-
based plan utility. We adopt the paradigm of probabilistic
propositional planning [5] in which operators are specified in
an extended STRIPS-like notation called PSO (Probabilis-
tic STRIPS Operator) [22]. A classical STRIPS operator
is defined by precondition and a set of effects. The former
identifies the set of states in which the action can be exe-
cuted, and the latter describes how the environment changes
as a result of taking the action. A PSO operator associates
actions to stochastic effects, a list of variable values with
a probability attached. Using a planner as Buridan [22] we
can calculate the probability that a plan reaches a goal state.
5. MORALEMOTIONS INDELIBERATION
In (Fig. 2) the agent’s architecture is depicted with her
mental state described in Section 4. In addition, the agent
maintains in her memory the optimum plan piopt and the set
UASet (Updates Action Set) formed by the pairs (updates,
action). The element updates identifies a set of changes in
the belief base B. Every update can be either an addition or
a deletion of one of the conditions associated to a goal (i.e.
Ac, Sc, Fc) or an addition or deletion of one of the condi-
tions Vc associated to a value. The element action is the
action that caused the change (it may be empty if the agent
chitectures a structure is maintained to keep the high-level
goals in relation to their subgoals.
Figure 2: The agent’s architecture
has no knowledge of the nature of the update, i.e. the agent
could not know the cause of the update). Note that using
a data structure to trace the changes in the beliefs base is
in line with current architecture for BDI agent as Jadex [28]
and Jason [4]. In the following we describe the agent’s rea-
soning cycle depicted in (Fig. 2). Before the agent starts the
reasoning cycle, she observes the Initialize phase in which
she perceives the enviroment and updates her belief base ac-
cording to what she has perceived
Value Monitoring: if a condition vc of a value vi ∈ V
holds in B then the value is at stake and added to the list.
Goal Formation: every individual goal in the sleeping
set is checked to verify if any of its adopting conditions ac
holds in the belief base. If so, it becomes an adopted and
suspended goal. Then, zero or more moral goals gi moti-
vated by the values at stake vi are adopted by the agent.
Value-sensitive Deliberation: The agent starts to find
plans in order to satisfy her goals. For every goal gi(Ac,
Sc, Fc, S, Π) ∈ G, each plan pii,k in Π is expanded2. Ac-
cording to BDI model [6], the agent has to choose the goals
to commit to (which becomes active). This phase is based
on anticipatory emotional appraisal and value-sensitive de-
liberation (see Anticipatory Emotional Appraisal and Goal
PlanSelection in Fig. 2): the agent performs a prospect rea-
soning to detect conflicts between goals and values. Then,
she calculates the emotional reward for every goal gi ∈G and
for each plan pii,k ∈ Π. Joy, Distress, Pride and Self-reproach
are the emotions considered in the deliberation process.
Anticipatory Emotional appraisal: In order to eval-
uate the emotional reward utility, we make use of the fol-
lowing functions: I, P and E. The I function returns the
importance of a goal. The function P returns the probabil-
2In this phase, for computational reasons, the plan is only
partially expanded. Following the work in [8], plans can
include ‘abstract actions’ that enable the agent to postpone
part of the planning process at execution phase.
Algorithm 1 Anticipatory Emotional Appraisal
piopt = nil;
uopt = minPossibleV alue;
for all gi ∈ G do
for all pii,k ∈ Plans do
u(pii,k) = calculateUtility(pii,k);
if u(pii,k) > uopt then
uopt = u(pii,k);
piopt = pii,k;
end if
end for
end for
return piopt;
ity of success of the plan, while the function E returns the
cost of the plan. The expected emotional reward (EER) of
a plan pii,k is based on the conflict between goals and val-
ues [2] that the agent derives by the prospect reasoning. A
plan can achieve one or more individual goals but, at the
same time, can make some other adopted individual goals
unachievable. Further, a plan pii,k can re-establish a value
at stake vi ∈ VatStake and at the same time can threaten
another value vj ∈ V . As a consequence, the emotional re-
ward derives from: (1) the intensity of the joy that the agent
feels if she reachs the individual goal gi ∈ GI through the
plan pii,k; (2) the distress intensity that the agent feels if,
executing the plan pii,k, some other adopted goals ∈ GI has
become unachieved; (3) the pride intensity that the agent
feels if she re-establishes a value at stake vi through the
plan and reaches the related moral goal gs ∈ GS ; (4) the
self-reproach intensity that the agent feels if the plan pii,k
threatens some other values vj in V . Given a plan pii,k,
we noted with GA the set of individual goals satisfied by
the plan, with GT the set of individual goals threatened,
with VB the set of values re-established and with VT the set
of values put at stake. The intensity of anticipatory emo-
tions Joy EERJ(GA, pii,k), Distress EERD(GT , pii,k), Pride
EERP (VB , pii,k)and Self-reproach EERSR(VT , pii,k)) are:
EERJ(GA, pii,k) =
P (pii,k) ∗
∑
ga∈GA
I(ga)
E(pii,k)
(1)
EERD(GT , pii,k) =
P (pii,k) ∗
∑
gt∈GT
(I(gt))
E(pii,k)
(2)
EERP (VB , pii,k) =
P (pii,k) ∗
∑
vb∈VB
(r(vb) + d(vb))
E(pii,k)
(3)
EERSR(VT , pii,k) =
P (pii,k) ∗
∑
vt∈VT
(r(vt) + d(vt))
E(pii,k)
(4)
where, in the equations 3 and 4, the priority of values and
their degree shared with the society are taken into consid-
eration. Finally, the overall plan utility based on emotional
reward is computed as:
u(pii,k) = (EERJ + EERP )− (EERD + EERSR) (5)
For example, Max has the goal to eat a chocolate candy.
In order to satisfy his goal, the chocolate candy must be
stolen from Mary but the ’steal’ action makes the violation
condition of the value ‘honesty’ true. So, if Max executes
his plan, the emotional reward utility is derived from the
Joy intensity and the Self-reproach intensity. Let us con-
sider another plan, in which Max asks Mary to give him the
chocolate candy. In this case no value is put at stake and
the emotional reward utility is derived from the Joy inten-
sity only. If the value ’honesty’ is very important for Max,
he chooses the plan to ask Mary the chocolate candy, even
if the plan can have a less probability of success.
Goal/plan selection: Once the emotion utility is calcu-
lated for every goal gi ∈ G (and every plan pii,k ∈ Π), the
agent will choose the plan with the best reward utility. The
goal related to this plan becomes a goal with an active state
(i.e. the current agent intention) and the plan is chosen for
execution by the agent.
Execution: following the work in [8], the piopt plan is
further expanded. The agent starts to execute an action of
the optimal plan piopt.
Monitoring: the agent perceives the world and updates
her beliefs (update(B)).
Emotional Appraisal: The agent checks the UASet in
order to assess what changes have occurred and their cause.
According to the type of updates (goals achieved or failed
and values re-established or at stake) the agent feels a cer-
tain emotion type. In Table 1 we recorded the rules with
which the emotions are generated and how their intensity
is computed. The ‘Category’ column specifies the emotions
category, the ‘Eliciting condition’ column explains the rules
used to generate the emotions, the ‘Agent’ column specifies
who performed the action and, finally, the ‘Intensity’ column
shows the formulas used to compute the emotion intensity.
Our intensity model is based on the expect utility model [19]
but, while in the expected utility model are taken into ac-
count probability and utility of goals attainment, we also
include an effort cost. Concerning the intensity of moral
emotions, we propose equations with more parameters than
other computational model [29, 15] that include moral emo-
tions in their work. Clearly, we have to assess the validation
of our proposal with a test to figure out if our prediction are
in line with human behaviour as suggested by [19].
Inspired by the work on ‘literary feelings’ by [27], in the fol-
lowing we refer to examples taken from the clay-animated
film ‘Mary and Max’ by Adam Elliott (Australia, 2009).
Mary and Max are friends and they are going for a walk in
Central Park in New York city. In the examples reported
below, if the UASet contains a pair <updates, action> in
which the updates element can be one of the following:
• An addition of a success condition of a goal gi ∈ GI ,
the agent feels a Joy emotion e(Joy, IJ , gi, self) be-
cause the goal gi is reached (regardless of who per-
formed the action). The intensity depends on the im-
portance (intrinsic and extrinsic) of the goal achieved
and on the effort that the agent made to achieve her
goal.
Example: Max is happy because he satisfied the goal
of eating a vanilla ice cream.
• An addition of a failure condition of a goal gi ∈ GI ,
the agent feels a Distress emotion e(Distress, ID, gi,
self) because the goal gi is unachieved, regardless of
who performed the action. The intensity depends on
the importance of the goal and the effort, as Joy.
Example: Max is sad because he has no money and his
goal of eating a vanilla ice cream cannot be satisfied.
• A deletion of a violation condition of a value vi ∈
VatStake and the action is an action performed by the
agent, the agent feels a Pride emotion e(Pride, IP ,
vi, self) because the value is re-established. The in-
tensity depends on the value rank, the importance of
the moral goal, the effort made and the society value
degree. The latter is considered as a measure of the
admiration that the agent receives from others.
Example: a robber assaults a little old lady in order to
steal her necklace. Max, who is very brave, helps the
old lady out and stops the robber by immobilizing him.
Max is very proud of himself, because he re-established
the value ‘honesty’ put at stake by the robber.
• An addition of a violation condition of a value vi ∈ V
and the action is an action performed by the agent, the
agent feels a Self-Reproach emotion e(Self-reproach,
ISR, vi, self) because the value is put at stake. The
intensity depends on the value rank, the effort made
and the society value degree. The latter is considered
as a measure of the reproach that the agent receives
from others.
Example: Max is ashamed because he put the value
‘honesty’ at stake by stealing a chocolate candy from
Mary.
• A deletion of a violation condition of a value vi ∈
VatStake and the action is an action performed by an-
other agent, the agent feels an Admiration emotion
e(Admiration, IA, vi, other) because the value is re-
established. The emotion is directed towards the agent
who performed the action. The intensity depends on
the value rank and on the importance of the moral
goal. Note that, if the agent has noticed that a value
is at stake, then she must have a moral goal gi moti-
vated by the value. The intensity of admiration emo-
tions depends on how the agent herself believes the
value important.
Example: Mary is proud of Max because he re-established
the value at stake ‘honesty’, that both share, by stop-
ping the robber.
• An addition of a violation condition of a value vi ∈ V
and the action is an action performed by another agent,
the agent feels a Reproach emotion e(Reproach, IR,
vi, other) because the value is put at stake. The emo-
tion is towards the agent who performed the action.
The intensity of the Reproach emotion depends on the
value rank and on the importance of the moral goal.
Example: the old lady feels a reproach emotion di-
rected toward the robber because he put at stake her
value ’honesty’.
• An addition of a success condition of a goal gi ∈ GI ,
a deletion of a violation condition of a value vi ∈
VatStake and the action is an action performed by the
Table 1: Emotion generation rules
Category Eliciting condition Agent Intensity
Joy a goal gi ∈ GI achieved self/other Imp(gi) ∗ E(pii,k)
Distress a goal gi ∈ GI not achieved self/other Imp(gi) ∗ E(pii,k)
Pride a value vi ∈ VatStake balanced self (r(vi) + Imp(gi) + d(vi)) ∗ E(pii,k)
Sef-reproach a value vi ∈ V at stake self (r(vi) + Imp(gi) + d(vi)) ∗ E(pii,k)
Admiration a value vi ∈ VatStake balanced other r(vi) + Imp(gi)
Reproach a value vi(r, C) ∈ V at stake other r(vi) + Imp(gi)
Gratification a goal gi ∈ GI achieved, a value vi ∈ VatStake balanced self I(Joy) + I(Pride)
Gratitude a goal gi ∈ GI achieved, a value vi ∈ VatStake balanced other I(Joy) + I(Admiration)
Remorse a goal gi ∈ GI achieved, a value vi ∈ V at stake self I(Self-reproach) + I(Distress)
Anger a goal gi ∈ GI not achieved, a value vi ∈ V at stake other I(Reproach) + I(Distress)
agent, the agent feels a Gratification category emo-
tion e(Gratification, IG, vi, self) because the individ-
ual goal is reached and the value re-established. Fol-
lowing the OCC model [26], Gratifications emotion is
a compound emotions and the intensity is the sum of
the intensity of Pride Emotion and Joy Emotion.
Example: the robber tries to steal the wallet to Max.
Max is gratified about himself because he stopped the
robber and saved his own wallet (the robber is not so
lucky in anyone of these examples).
• An addition of a success condition of a goal gi ∈ GI , a
deletion of a violation condition of a value vi ∈ VatStake
and the action is an action performed by another agent,
the agent feels a Gratitude emotion e(Gratitude, IG,
vi, other) because the individual goal is reached and
the value re-established. The emotion is towards the
agent who performed the action. The intensity of
Gratitude emotion is the sum of the intesity of Ad-
miration emotion and Joy emotion.
Example: the old lady is grateful to Max because he
stopped the robbing and saved her necklace.
• An addition of a failure condition of a goal gi ∈ GI , an
addition a violation condition of a value vi ∈ V and the
action is an action performed by the agent, the agent
feels a Remorse emotions e(Remorse, IR, vi, other)
because the goal is unachieved and the value is put at
stake. The intensity of Remorse emotion is the sum
of the intesity of Self-reproach emotion and Distress
emotion.
Example: Max feels remorse because he stole the choco-
late candy from Mary and, as a consequence, Mary
didn’t want to eat dinner with him. The value ‘hon-
esty’ is put at stake and the goal of eating with Mary
is unsatisfied.
• An addition of a failure condition of a goal gi ∈ GI , an
addition of a violation condition of a value vi ∈ V and
the action is an action performed by another agent,
the agent feels a Anger category emotion e(Anger,
IA, vi, other). The emotion is towards the agent who
performed the action. The intensity of Anger emotion
is the sum of the intesity of Reproach emotion and Dis-
tress emotion.
Example: Mary is angry with Max because he stole
her chocolate and put at stake her value ‘honesty’ and
he theatened the goal of eating dinner together.
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we presented the integration of emotional
appraisal into a value–sensitive agent model. In our pro-
posal, emotional appraisal plays the two fold role of driving
the selection of goals and plans, and determining the gen-
eration of emotional states into the agent. Agents who feel
(and can express) moral emotions as part of their deliber-
ative processes and can appraise their own and the others’
behavior in terms of moral emotions can be positively em-
ployed in applications that range from virtual companions
to education and training.
The model we propose meets a set of requirements put
forth by the research on emotions, such as the generation
of moral emotions, necessary to create empathic agents, the
generation of emotional states, which may be useful for the
communication with other agents, the synchronisation with
the values shared by a community via the drive provided by
moral emotions in deliberation.
Some aspects of the model have not been explored into
depth. For example, the model does not allows distinguish-
ing goal failure from the simple inability to make the success
condition of the goal true (for wrong execution, accidental
failure, etc.). Intuitively, at the emotional level, this differ-
ence has to do with negative feelings such as frustration and,
again, with the notion of responsibility (for example, in case
an agent has undertaken the execution of an action based
on a wrong assessment of her own capabilities). We don’t
model yet the behavior and cognitive consequent model that
we reserve for future work.
Future work also includes the extension of the agent archi-
tecture to include different model of emotions. For example,
we plan to include a richer representation of the emotions (in
order to generate different emotional states within the same
emotion category), a decay function and an overall mood
state that can influence cognitive and behavioral aspects of
the agent as in [15, 18]. Finally, we plan to implement our
model and to test it in order to assert the validation of the
model and of the equations with which the emotional re-
ward utility of agent’s plans and the intensity of emotion
are computed in the Anticipatory appraisal phase and in
the Emotional Appraisal phase. Some future decisions, as
noted by [25], can be influenced by the domain application.
Our aim is creating dramatic believable characters, situated
into a virtual enviroment, being able to resolve moral conflict
and to create a meaningful story in a storytelling system.
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